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Sumner: Police Interrogation: Michigan v. Tucker

TESTATOR'S INTENT
those to whom they are addressed; but when used to express his
manifest intention to control or direct, they are mandatory and will
53
be so construed in saying what effect is to be given to them ....
SAMUEL STUART GOREN

Police Interrogation: Michigan v. Tucker
In the dramatic case of Michigan v. Tucker,' the Supreme Court decided that during an in-custody interrogation of a suspect all the warnings as outlined in the Miranda' decision need not be given. Even
though the interrogation took place prior to Miranda, the Court mandated that an accused be given certain warnings before he is interrogated.
Tucker had been arrested on a charge of rape, and before the interrogation the police advised him that any statement he made could be
used against him at trial. Furthermore, he was advised that he had
a right to remain silent and a right to counsel. However, the police
did not inform him that if he were indigent that counsel would be furnished for him. Respondent told police that he did not want an attorney and that he understood his constitutional rights. Nevertheless,
during the course of the interrogation, Tucker informed the authorities
that he was with a friend and divulged the identity of his alibi [Henderson]. The later statements of Henderson tended to incriminate Tucker
and Henderson stated that respondent was not with him at the -time
of the crime. It is to be remembered that these events preceded Miranda.
Before his trial following the Supreme Court decision in Miranda,
the respondent moved to suppress the expected incriminating testimony
of Henderson; the reason being that the respondent had disclosed Henderson's identity without having received the full warnings required by
Miranda.' The state court denied the motion and permitted Henderson to testify and respondent was convicted at the trial. Respondent
53. In re Estate of Corbett, 430 Pa. 54, at 57-58, 241 A.2d 524 at 525 (1968); see
also, Canal National Bank v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 629 (D.C. Me., 1966); Good
Samaritan Hospital and Medical Center v. United States National Bank of Oregon, 246
Ore. 478, 425 P.2d 541 (1967); Frederick v. Frederick, 355 Mass. 662, 247 N.E.2d 361
(1969).
1. 42 U.S.L.W. 4887 (June 10, 1974).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1964).
3. Miranda was decided by the Supreme Court after the interrogation of Tucker,
but before his trial.
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then appealed and his conviction was affirmed by both the Michigan
Court of Appeals4 and by the Michigan Supreme Court. 5
After having his conviction affirmed by the state court, respondent
then sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court. 6 In the district court proceedings, the habeas corpus relief was granted on the
grounds that Henderson's testimony was inadmissible since it was in violation of Miranda. The district court went on to say that the application of the Exclusionary Rule was necessary in this instance to protect
the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower
courts' decision without an opinion.7 On writ of certiorari,the United
States Supreme Court reversed."
In speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice Rehnquist said
The police conduct in this case, though failing to afford respondent
the full measure of procedural safeguards later set forth in Miranda,
did not deprive respondent of his privilege against self-incrimination.
The record clearly shows that respondent's statements during the 'police interrogation were not involuntary or the result of potential legal
sanctions. 9
The Tucker case provided the opportunity for the Court to implement safeguards of suspects during police interrogation. Yet the Court
failed to seize such an opportunity to render justice to those accused
of crimes and stated that
. .. the use of :the testimony of a witness discovered by the police as a
result of the accused's statements under these circumstances does not
violate any requirement under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, relating to the adversary system.' 0
Tucker's far-reaching implications in the realm of Fifth Amendment
protections are clear. One could easily assume that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda go hand in hand.
But after reading the Tucker case, one may easily get the impression
that the case Issevering the connection between the self-incrimination
clause and Miranda.
The roots of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination can
be traced back to England and the days of the ecclesiastical courts. In
the proceedings of the ecclesiastical courts, a person appearing before
it was required to take an oath, "ex officio." The offensive characteristic
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

19 Mich. App.320, 172 N.W.2d 712 (1969).
385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971).
352 F. Supp.266 (1972).
480 F.2d 927 (1973).
414 U.S. 1062 (1974).

9. 94 S.Ct. at 2359.
10. Id. at 2361-2366.
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of this procedure in which the oath was a part, was its requirement that
a person who had not been charged by a formal presentment or accusation answer under oath all questions put to him by the proper ecclesiastical official."
This "ex officio" oath had widespread use throughout the country.
The purpose in most cases of the oath was "to discover suspected violations of church law or custom, or to establish the truth of either vague
or definite charges not disclosed to the personal question."' 2
The introduction of the oath into the ecclesiastical trials was what gave
birth to the privilege of the accused not being compelled to testify against
himself. The Bishops of the ecclesiastical courts used the oath to inquire into the conduct of men who were respected in the community.
The use of the oath caused a great deal of serious injury to the reputations of these men when they were compelled to testify. This then
brought complaints from the common people to the king. It was the
complaints of the people which led King Henry III to issue an official
proclamation to one Bishop, which forbade him to use -the oath. This
proclamation was perhaps the origin of the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination as we know it today.
The practice of compelling an accused man to testify against himself
was also prevalent in criminal trials before the King's Councils. The
accused in a criminal trial had to appear and answer all questions that
were put to him. However, in the 25th year of Edward III, a statute
was enacted that demanded that this practice be abolished and no man
should "be put to answer without presentment before justices, or matter
of -record,3or by due process and writ original, according to the law of
'
the land.'
As heretofore mentioned, it appears that the origin of the privilege
against self-incrimination was hastened by the discontent of the people
with the violation of their fundamental rights. "Thus it seems that
beginning with 1641, the common law courts were at least occasionally applying to their own procedure at trial the prohibition which
they had previously placed upon the procedure of the church courts
Furthermore, "it seems fair to conclude
before formal accusations."'
that by the middle of the eighteenth century they were giving full recognition to the privilege." 15
Moreover, with the arrival of the American colonists in the New
World, also came -the privilege against being compelled to testify
11. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. R~v. 1 (1949).
12. Id.
13. LAWFUL PRESENTMENT AcT, 25 EDw. 3, c. 5 (1351-2).
14. Supra note 11, at 10.
15. Id. at 11.
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against oneself. It would be strange if not totally absurd for the colonists to have instituted in America the very thing that they had despised
in England. Coupled with that, it appears that before the adoption of
the Federal Constitution at least six colonies had provisions which
prohibited self-incrimination in their fundamental laws.' 6
Subsequently, with the adoption and ratification of the United States
Constitution, the framers of this instrument saw fit to include the Fifth
Amendment. That amendment which in part provides "that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,"' 7 provided the American citizens with their first solid protection
of not being compelled to testify against themselves. Needless to say the
privilege had now become the "law of the land."
Despite the fact that the Fifth Amendment was in effect and was
the "law of the land," physical force was still being used to coerce and
secure in-custody confessions by the police. There have been several
very extensive studies that were made during the early 1930's which
provide an abundance of documented instances to support this allegation."'
There have also been a great many cases where physical brutality and
coercion were used to induce or persuade the accused to render incustody confessions.'" In many instances, the detained person was neither granted
neither a preliminary hearing nor other due process protec0
tions.

2

The case that ushered in the Miranda Era was ithe case of Escobedo
v. Illinois. 2' In this historic case, the accused 'had been picked up as
a suspect in connection with a murder. His attorney, after receiving
word of his apprehension, immediately went to the police station and
demanded to see his client. However, his attorney was not allowed
to see him even though Escobedo had repeatedly asked to see his attorney. The attorney made every effort possible to see his client but he
was consistently refused permission to do go.
Nonetheless, the Court in Escobedo took the position that the accused by not 'being permitted to see counsel, after having requested
to see counsel, had been denied "the assistance of counsel"; and this
16. The six colonies were Virginia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, see 2 PooRE, UNITED STATES CHARTERS AND CONSrTruTIONS 1909, 1541-1542, 1409, 1806, 1 id.at 958, 2 id. at 1282 (2d ed. 1878).
17. U.S. CONST. AMEND.V.
18. Booth, Confessions and Methods Employed in Procuring Them, 4 So. CALIF. L.
REV. 83 (1930); Kauper, Judicial Examinations of the Accused-A Remedy for the
Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1932).
19. See People v. Portelli, 15 N.Y.2d 235, 205 N.E.2d 857, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931

(1965).
20. Harris v. State of S.C., 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
21. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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was a violation of -the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 2 The Court
went on to say "that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial. '' 23 It was !the Escobedo decision -that restored the accused's right to counsel which had
in the past -beendenied to him at many state -trials.
Miranda delineated the rights of an accused who was being interrogated while in police custody. In Miranda, the defendants, while being
interrogated by the authorities, were held in a room and cut off from
the outside world. None of the defendants at any time were given a
full warning of their rights prior to the interrogation. In Miranda and
its companion cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions. In three
of -the cases, there were signed statements of guilt which were subsequently admitted at trial. The Court's subsequent ruling that the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination had been violated has since become an essential part of our adversary system.
In the opinion written by Chief Justice Warren, -the court forged
ahead and mandated the famous Miranda warnings. Before stating the
warnings, the court went on to say that
• . . unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused
persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportun24
ity to exercise it the following measures are required.
The Court here seemed to require that these warnings be given until
some new method of securing the accused's constitutional rights could
be developed. The Court then proceeded to give 'the warnings as 'they
are 'being given today.
Prior to any questioning, the person must 'be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has
a right to the presence of an
25
attorney, either retained or appointed.
Looking at the birth and growth of the privilege against self-incrimination in retrospect, one can safely say -that it 'has been a right that had
a long and hard fight -toreach the point where it is today.
In Tucker, the Court was quick to come to the conclusion that Miranda was applicable to Tucker. Yet, in dealing with the issue of whether
the police in Tucker violated the accused's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court took even less time in answering
in the negative. Justice Rehnquist was under the impression -that the
police interrogation which the accused faced here bore no relationship
22. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 342 (1963).
23. Id. at 491.

24. 384 U.S. at 444.
25. Id.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1974

5

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1974], Art. 14

136

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

to the historical evils against which the privilege of compulsory selfincrimination was directed.
It seems very evident that the Supreme Court relied very heavily
upon the fact that the respondent spoke voluntarily during the interrogation. The court seized upon this fact and decided 'that the respondent was not subjected to self-incrimination, and for -this reason, his
rights were not violated. The respondent's voluntary confession and
refusal of an attorney were circumstances which were implicit in the
court's reaching its decision.
Yet, Justice Rehnquist after reaching the determination that there
was no compulsory self-incrimination involved in this case, felt compelled to recognize that there might have been an inadvertent disregard
or a slight omission of one of the Mirandawarnings.
Although there may have been an omission of one of the Miranda
warnings, the police at that particular time were guided by Escobedo.
Escobedo required only that investigating or interrogating officers inform the accused of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent,
which is exactly what -thepolice officers did in Tucker.
It must be remembered that the statements Tucker made while in
custody were omitted at trial. Nonetheless, the trial court denied respondents' motion to exclude Henderson's testimony. Furthermore,
the police acknowledged the fact that they -became aware of Henderson's identity by statements respondent made while in custody. This
raises the question whether or not the use of respondent's statement
constitutes the use of the "fruits of the poisonous !tree" and as such
should be suppressed. The Court answered in the negative. Rehnquist
pointed out that in Wong Sun v. United States26 the fruits of police
conduct which infringed upon the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights must be suppressed and may not be used later -to -make the prosecution's case. The factual situation in Wong Sun was that the accused
had been arrested and subsequently the police discovered damaging
evidence through in-custody statements made by the defendant. On
appeal the Supreme Court found the arrest invalid. The Court held
the arrest had been made without probable cause and that the evidence
obtained -through the illegal arrest could not be used at the trial against
the defendant.
Yet, it was the opinion of Rehnquist and other justices that police
conduct in the Tucker case "did not abridge respondents constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed
only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this court in
26. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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Miranda to safeguard that privilege. '27 It is Rehnquist's belief that
Wong Sun does not apply in -this instance. Only if Tucker's constitutional
rights had been infringed, would the testimony of Henderson have been
excluded. However, Rehnquist's distinguishing between rights and
privileges in the Fourth Amendment setting is at best myopic and at
least moronic.
. Looking realistically at the Tucker decision and at its historical background, there appear to be grave inconsistencies present. The Court
in Tucker seems to be saying -that -the Miranda warnings need not be
given as they were outlined in Miranda. The Court in Miranda clearly
stated that the warnings they outlined must be followed, "unless we
are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising
accused persons of their right of silence . . .,"2The Miranda Court
further intimated that these warnings were in no way a straitjacket and
left the avenue open for Congress and states to provide other means
of protection for the accused's rights. However, such other protective
mechanisms were not evident from the facts in this decision. Absolutely no effort was made to develop a new method of protecting the
accused's rights. Yet, -the Miranda warnings were narrowed considerably. Such circumstances clearly contravene the language of Miranda. The warnings must be given until viable alternatives are put into
effect.
The conclusion reached in Tucker was quite illogical in the sense
that the court ruled Miranda was applicable to the case but its safeguards were not applied. Furthermore, the decision represented an
attitude level of a law and order stance by the majority-a void once
filled with clear and cogent reasoning. To apply Mirandaon one hand
and on the other hand, not to follow its command is in effect to rewrite
the Miranda opinion to conform -to the Tucker opinion. The Court
could have overruled Miranda, but what would have -been its replacement?
The resolution of Tucker raises more problems than it solves. One
such problem being, how many of the Miranda warnings must the police give? If the Court has limited the warnings it should have written
new warnings to safeguard the accused's rights while in-custody interrogation is going on. Yet the court failed to respond to such problems.
In what may be best characterized as a collusion between the law and
order majority of the Supreme Court and the police,29 Tucker -represents a subtle attempt to usher the American people back into the era
27. 94 S. Ct. at 2364.
28. 94 S. Ct. at 467.
29. NoTE,The Impending Scope of the Exclsilonary Rule-Will the Supreme Court
Vandalize the Constitution, 5 N.C.C.L.J. 91 (1973).
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of the ecclesiastical courts from which our society has long since transcended. To allow the police to "inadvertently" omit one of the Miranda warnings, in effect, is to strip the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
of all meaning.
Further, Tucker cannot be reconciled with the Court's ruling in
Wong Sun. The use of Tucker's statement to learn the identity of Henderson is clearly a part of "the fruits of the poisonous tree" as was the
evidence derived from the illegal arrest in Wong Sun. To allow the
police to use Henderson as a witness against Tucker is to allow Tucker
to incriminate himself through his own statements and to help make
the prosecution's case a clear vi6lation of the accused's rights under the
Fifth Amendment.
Clearly, the Tucker decision represents a blotch on the theory that
the courts are the ultimate protectors of -the rights of an accused person.
The majority speaking through Rehnquist felt that by allowing -the respondent an opportunity to attack Henderson's credibility by confrontation and cross-examination was to keep Tucker's Fifth Amendment
rights secure and safe. Thus the court either inadvertently or knowingly overlooked the fact that confrontation and cross-examination
come at a later stage in the criminal process. Henderson's testimony
should have been suppressed ab initio. Obviously, an accused's Fifth
Amendment rights need protecting before trial during in-custody -interrogation if Mirandais to be regarded as no more than vacuous dicta.
If police are continually allowed to omit one or more of the Miranda
guidelines, the effect would be constitutionally debilitating.
The Court's reasoning in Tucker was not only unsound but if followed in future decisions, will prove to be erosive of an accused's Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.
QUENTIN

T. SUMNER

Class Actions and the Amount In Controversy
The question raised by Zahn v. International Paper Company 1 has
important effects upon the future of class actions under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically those grounded upon diversity jurisdiction. The central issue in the case is whether or not every person
represented as plaintiffs in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must meet
11. Zahn v. International Paper Company, 404 U.S. 291, 94 S. Ct. 505, 38 L. Ed.
2d 505 (1973).
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